Nice work if you can get out 谁都不愿摊上这种好事

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Why the rich now have less leisure than the poor

为什么当今富人的休闲时间比穷人还少

Apr 19th 2014 | From the print edition

1 FOR most of human history rich people had the most leisure. In “Downton Abbey”, a drama about the British upper classes of the early 20th century, one aloof aristocrat has never heard of the term “weekend”: for her, every day is filled with leisure. On the flip side, the poor have typically slogged. Hans-Joachim Voth, an economic historian at the University of Zurich, shows that in 1800 the average English worker laboured for 64 hours a week. “In the 19th century you could tell how poor somebody was by how long they worked,” says Mr Voth.

”2 In today's advanced economies things are different. Overall working hours have fallen over the past century. But the rich have begun to work longer hours than the poor. In 1965 men with a college degree, who tend to be richer, had a bit more leisure time than men who had only completed high school. But by 2005 the college-educated had eight hours less of it a week than the high-school grads. Figures from the American Time Use Survey, released last year, show that Americans with a bachelor's degree or above work two hours more each day than those without a high-school diploma. Other research shows that the share of college-educated American men regularly working more than 50 hours a week rose from 24% in 1979 to 28% in 2006, but fell for high-school dropouts. The rich, it seems, are no longer the class of leisure.

3 There are a number of explanations. One has to do with what economists call the “substitution effect”. Higher wages make leisure more expensive: if people take time off they give up more money. Since the 1980s the salaries of those at the top have risen strongly, while those below the median have stagnated or fallen. Thus rising inequality encourages the rich to work more and the poor to work less.

，4 The “winner-takes-all” nature of modern economies may amplify the substitution effect. The scale of the global market means businesses that innovate tend to reap huge gains (think of YouTube, Apple and Goldman Sachs). The returns for beating your competitors can be enormous. Research from Peter Kuhn of the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Fernando Lozano of Pomona College shows that the same is true for highly skilled workers. Although they do not immediately get overtime pay for “extra” hours, the most successful workers, often the ones putting in the most hours, may reap gains from winner-takes-all markets. Whereas in the early 1980s a man working 55 hours a week earned 11% more than a man putting in 40 hours in the same type of occupation, that gap had increased to 25% by the turn of the 5 Economists tend to assume that the substitution effect must at some stage be countered by an “income effect”: as higher wages allow people to satisfy more of their material needs, they forgo extra work and instead choose more leisure. A billionaire who can afford his own island has little incentive to work that extra hour. But new social mores may have flipped the income effect on its head.

6 The status of work and leisure in the rich world has changed since the days of “Downton Abbey”. Back in 1899 Thorstein Veblen, an American economist who dabbled in sociology, offered his take on things. He argued that leisure was a “badge of honour”. Rich people could get others to do the dirty, repetitive work—what Veblen called “industry”. Yet Veblen's leisure class was not idle. Rather they engaged in “exploit”: challenging and creative activities such as writing, philanthropy and debating.

7 Veblen's theory needs updating, according to a recent paper from researchers at Oxford University*. Work in advanced economies has become more knowledge-intensive and intellectual. There are fewer really dull jobs, like lift-operating, and more glamorous ones, like fashion design. That means more people than ever can enjoy “exploit” at the office. Work has come to offer the sort of pleasures that rich people used to seek in their time off. On the flip side, leisure is no longer a sign of social power. Instead it symbolises uselessness and unemployment.

8 The evidence backs up the sociological theory. The occupations in which people are least happy are manual and service jobs requiring little skill. Job satisfaction tends to increase with the prestige of the occupation. Research by Arlie Russell Hochschild of the University of California, Berkeley, suggests that as work becomes more intellectually stimulating, people start to enjoy it more than home life. “I come to work to relax,” one interviewee tells Ms Hochschild. And wealthy people often feel that lingering at home is a waste of time. A study in 2006 revealed that Americans with a household income of more than $100,000 indulged in 40% less “passive leisure” (such as watching TV) than those earning less than $20,000.

Condemned to relax

休闲是无奈之举

9 What about less educated workers? Increasing leisure time probably reflects a deterioration in their employment prospects as low-skill and manual jobs have withered. Since the 1980s, high-school dropouts have fared badly in the labour market. In 1965 the unemployment rate of American high-school graduates was 2.9 percentage points higher than for those with a bachelor's degree or more. Today it is 8.4 points higher. “Less educated people are not necessarily buying their way into leisure,” explains Erik Hurst of the University of Chicago. “Some of that time off work may be involuntary.” There may also be change in the income effect for those on low wages. Information technology, by opening a vast world of high-quality and cheap home entertainment, means that low-earners do not need to work as long to enjoy a reasonably satisfying leisure.

从历史上来看，但凡富人都是最闲的。在讲述20世纪初期英国上层社会的电视剧《唐顿庄园》中，一位冷漠的贵族从未听说过“周末”一词：对她来说，每天都有大把的闲暇时间。相比之下，穷人则是典型地终日劳作。苏黎世大学的经济史专家汉斯-约阿希姆?沃斯说，在1800年时，英国工人每周的平均工作时间为64个时。“判断一个人是有钱还是没钱，只要看他的工作时间就可以了。

在当今的发达经济体中，情况依然发生了变化。在过去的一个世纪中，整体的工作时间一直在减少。但是，富人的工作时间已经开始超过穷人。在1965年时，拥有大学学位的人——他们往往容易成为比较富有的人——还能比仅仅上完高中的人多享受一点闲暇时间。但是，到2005年时，他们每周的闲暇时间反而比后者减少了8个小时。据去年发布的《美国时间利用调查报告》显示，在美国，相比没有高中文凭的人，拥有学士学位及学士学位以上的人，每天要多工作2个小时。其他的调查显示，在每周工作时间通常超过50个小时的美国人中，拥有大学文凭的比例已经从1979年的24%上升到2006年的28%。相比之下，没有读完高中的人在其中所占的比例一直处于下降的趋势。由此看来，富人已经不再是有闲一族了。

这种变化可以从多个方面来解释。其中之一同经济学家所说的“替代效应”有关。工资越高，闲暇的代价就越大；想休班，就得牺牲挣钱的机会。自上世纪80年代以来，顶层的收入迅猛增长，而低于中位数的人群的收入要么处于裹足不前

要么有所下降。于是，日趋严重的不平等就会鼓励富人多工作，穷人少工作。

millennium.

当代经济“赢者通吃”的特点可能会放大替代效应。市场的大小决定了挣钱的多少。在全球化时代，创新往往能带来巨额的利润。（在这方面，YouTube、苹果和高盛都是绝好的例子。）打败竞争对手的回报可能是巨大的。研究显示，对于高技能工人来说，情况同样如此。尽管他们不会因为“额外”工作时间比别人多而立即得到超额的报酬，但是最为成功的工人——通常是那些将大部分时间投入到工作中的人——可能会从赢者通吃的市场获得高额的回报。上世纪80年代初期，在从事同一种职业的人中，每周工作55个小时的人的工资比每周工作40个小时的多11%；到2000年时，这一差距已经拉大到25%。

在经济学家看来，替代效应必然会在某个阶段遭遇“收入效应”的阻击：工资的提高允许人们去满足更多的物质需求。为此，他们会放弃加班，更多地选择休闲。买得起私人岛屿的百万富翁是没有加班的动力的。但是，新的社会风尚可能会令收入效应产生逆转。

自“唐顿庄园”时代以来，在富国中，工作与休闲的位置就已经发生了逆转。回到1899年，亦涉足社会学的美国经济学家托斯丁·韦布伦曾给出过自己的解释。他说，闲暇是一种“荣誉勋章”。富人可以让别人去干脏活和重复性的劳动——这就是韦布伦所谓的“工业”。然而，有闲一族是不能无所事事的。相反，他们应当致力于“开拓”，从事类似于写作、慈善和辩论等具有挑战性和创新性的工作。

根据牛津大学研究者的最新论文，韦布伦的理论需要更新了。在发达经济体中，工作已经变得更加依赖于知识和智力。像开电梯这样的真正无聊的工作已经越来越少，而像时装设计这样的有吸引力的工作却越来越多。也就是说，能够在办公室中享受“开拓”的人正在日益增加。工作已经开始提供富人常常在闲暇的时候去追求的那种休闲。反过来说，闲暇已经不再是社会地位的象征。相反，它所代表的是毫无用处和失业。

这些证据是有社会学理论来支撑的。人们最不乐意从事的职业是体力劳动和对技能要求不高的服务性工作。工作满意度会随着职业的优越性而增加。加州大学伯克利分校的霍奇柴尔德指出，随着工作更多地由知识来推动，人们开始享受工作甚于享受休闲。一位受访者告诉霍奇柴尔德：“我工作的目的，就是为了放松”。与此同时，富人也经常会产生一种“在家闲着就是浪费时间”的认识。2006年的一份研究表明，家庭收入超过1000000美元的美国人沉湎于“被动休闲”（如看电视）的时间比家庭收入不足20000美元的少40%。

那么受教育程度较低的工人又是什么情况呢？随着低技能工作和体力劳动的逐渐萎缩，闲暇时间的增加可能反映了就业前景的恶化。自上世纪80年代以来，高中辍学者在劳动力市场上的待遇一直不好。1965年时，拥有高中文凭的美国人的失业率比拥有学士学位或学士学位以上的高出2.9个百分点。如今，这一数字上升到8.4个百分点。芝加哥大学的埃里克·赫斯特解释说：“受教育程度低的人是不必花钱买闲暇的，有些闲暇时间可能是非自愿性的。”收入效应对低收入者的影响也可能发生了变化。信息技术在为我们打开了一个高质量低收费的家庭娱乐之广阔世界的同时，也意味着低收入者不必为了享受合理的称心如意的闲暇而去长时间地工作

The once and future currency 美元—曾经的和未来的货币

Free exchange自由交流

The once and future currency

曾经的和未来的货币

A new book examines the world's love-hate relationship with the dollar

新书探讨了全世界与美元之间的爱恨情仇

Mar 8th 2014 | From the print edition

1 “LUMPY, unpredictable, potentially large”: that was how Tim Geithner, then head of the New York Federal Reserve, described the need for dollars in emerging economies in the dark days of October 2008, according to transcripts of a Fed meeting released last month. To help smooth out those lumps, the Fed offered to “swap” currencies with four favoured central banks, as far off as South Korea and Singapore. They could exchange their own money for dollars at the prevailing exchange rate (on condition that they later swap them back again at the same rate). Why did the Fed decide to reach so far beyond its shores? It worried that stress in a financially connected emerging economy could eventually hurt America. But Mr Geithner also hinted at another motive. “The privilege of being the reserve currency of the world comes with some burdens,” he said.

2 That privilege is the subject of a new book, “The Dollar Trap”, by Eswar Prasad of Cornell University, who shares the world's ambivalence towards the currency. The 2008 financial crisis might have been expected to erode the dollar's global prominence. Instead, he argues, it cemented it. America's fragility was, paradoxically, a source of strength for its currency.

3 In the last four months of 2008 America attracted net capital inflows of half a trillion dollars. The dollar was a haven in tumultuous times, even when the tumult originated in America itself. The crisis also “shattered conventional views” about the adequate level of foreign-exchange reserves, prompting emerging economies with large dollar hoards to hoard even more. Finally, America's slump forced the Fed to ease monetary policy dramatically. In response, central banks in emerging economies bought dollars to stop their own currencies rising too fast.

4 Could Fed swap lines serve as a less costly alternative to rampant reserve accumulation? If central banks could obtain dollars from the Fed whenever the need arose, they would not need to husband their own supplies. The demand is there: India, Indonesia, the Dominican Republic and Peru have all made inquiries. The swap lines are good business: the Fed keeps the interest from the foreign central bank's loans to banks, even though the other central bank bears the credit risk. The Fed earned 6.84% from South Korea's first swap, for example. But it is not a business the Fed wants to be in. As one official said, “We're not advertising.”

5 Swap lines would help emerging economies endure the dollar's reign. But will that reign endure? Mr Prasad thinks so. The dollar's position is “suboptimal but stable and self-reinforcing,” he writes. Much as Mr Prasad finds America's privileges distasteful, his book points to the country's qualifications for the job.

6 America is not only the world's biggest economy, but also among the most sophisticated. Size and sophistication do not always go together. In the 1900s the pound was the global reserve currency and Britain's financial system had the widest reach. But America was the bigger economy. In the 2020s China will probably be the world's biggest economy, but not the most advanced.

7 America's sophistication is reflected in the depth of its financial markets. It is unusually good at creating tradeable claims on the profits and revenues that its economy generates. In a more primitive system, these spoils would mostly accrue to the state or tycoons; in America, they back a vast range of financial assets.

8 Mr Prasad draws the obvious contrast with China and its currency, the yuan, a “widely hyped” alternative to the dollar. China's GDP is now over half the size of America's. But its debt markets are one-eighth as big, and foreigners are permitted to own only a tiny fraction of them. China's low central-government debt should be a source of strength for its currency. But it also limits the volume of financial instruments on offer.

9 America has a big external balance-sheet, if not an obviously strong one. Its foreign liabilities exceed its overseas assets. But this worrying fact conceals a saving grace: its foreign assets are unusually adventurous and lucrative. Its liabilities, on the other hand, are largely liquid, safe and low-yielding. America therefore earns more on its foreign assets than it pays on its foreign liabilities.

10 Alongside its economic maturity, America also has a greying population. This ageing is a source of economic weakness. But, Mr Prasad argues, it may be another reason for the dollar's global appeal. America's pensioners hold a big chunk of the government debt that is not held by foreigners. A formidable political constituency, they will not allow the government to inflate away the value of these claims. Thus America's powerful pensioners serve to protect the interests of its generous foreign creditors.

11 America's sophistication has one final implication: the dollar has no long-term tendency to strengthen. That again contrasts with its principal long-run rival. China is still a catch-up economy. As it narrows the productivity gap with America, its exchange rate, adjusted for inflation, will tend to rise. The yuan has appreciated by about 35% against the dollar since mid-2005.

A self-deprecating currency一种自我贬值的货币

12 The dollar's depreciation over that period is, of course, bad for anyone holding American assets. But the dollar is not merely a store of value. It has also become a popular “funding” currency. Banks and multinational firms borrow in dollars, even as they accumulate assets in other denominations. Since no one wants to borrow in a currency that only goes up, this is not a role that China's currency could easily play. Moreover, because of its role as a funding currency, the dollar tends to strengthen in times of crisis. That explains why emerging economies feel a “lumpy”, “unpredictable” need for dollars. America's currency may not hold its value against others. But in times of stress, the appeal of a dollar asset is that it always holds its value against a dollar debt. The dollar is a global hegemon partly because it is also a global hedge.

“成批的、不可预测的、可能会非常大的，”据上个月公布的美联储会议记录，这是时任纽约联邦储备银行行长蒂姆·盖特纳在描述新兴经济体在2008年10月最黑暗的那几天中对于美元的需要时曾经说过的一句话。为了帮助消除那些成批的需求，美联储提出，可以为包括远在韩国央行和新加坡央行在内的四家关系较好的央行提供货币“交换”。这四家央行可以用它们自己的货币以现行汇率换成美元（其前提条件是，它们在以后还要用相同的汇率将美元换回自己的货币）美联储为何要决定将其影响力扩展到离美国这么远的国家呢？[原因在于，]它担心金融联系密切相关的新兴世界的压力可能最终会伤害美国。不过，盖特纳还暗示了美联储的另一个动机。“成为世界储备货币后，在享有特权的同时也得承担某些责任，”他说道。

这种特权就是康奈尔大学的埃斯瓦尔·普拉萨德在其新著《美元陷阱》中要与读者分享的主题。他在书中指出，世界对美元存在着一种矛盾心态。人们原本希望2008年的金融危机能够消除这种货币在全世界的主宰地位。但令人不解的是，那场危机反而强化了美元的主宰，她的脆弱反倒成为了美元力量的来源。

在2008年的最后4个月中，美国吸引的资本净流入达到5000亿美元。美元是乱世的天堂，甚至就在造就乱世的是美国自己时也是如此。危机还“打破了”外汇储备应当保持在一个适当水平的“传统观点”，促使具有大量美元的新兴经济体储备了更多的美元。最后，美国的迅速衰落还迫使美联储戏剧性地放松了货币政策。作为回应，新兴经济体的央行买入美元以阻止自己的货币过快升值。

美联储的货币互换能够作为一种代价较低的替代方式以取代泛滥的储备累计吗？如果各国央行能在需求上升的时候从美联储获得美元，他们可能就不必在吝惜本国货币的供应了。因为，需求是明摆着的。印度，印度尼西亚，多尼米加和秘鲁都曾提出过这种请求。货币互换是一桩好买卖：美联储获得了外国央行将货币放贷给银行的利息，即便是在外国央行要为此而承担信贷风险时也是如此。例如，美联储从与韩国进行的第一次货币互换中获得了6.84%的利息。但这不是美联储想参与其中的那种买卖。正如某官员所说：“我们不想推而广之。”

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